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Abstract 
The paper reviews recent UK productivity performance using insights from new growth economics 
and its embodiment in growth accounting techniques. The sources of the UK labour productivity 
gap are found to differ across countries; broad capital per worker plays a larger part with regard to 
France and Germany while innovation matters more compared with the USA. The role of incentive 
structures is examined and the importance of competition as an antidote to agency problems in UK 
firms is highlighted. Current UK policy is reviewed and the need to address government as well as 
market failures is stressed. 
JEL classification: D24, O47, O52. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Better productivity is a key aspiration of the present UK government. As the Pre-
Budget Report of 1998 put it, ‘Productivity ... is a fundamental yardstick of 
economic performance.… We are not as productive as our major partners and 
the extent of our under-performance is very substantial.... tackling it must be a 
central national priority’ (HM Treasury, 1998, p. 28). 
A much more comprehensive statement of the present government’s view 
both of the nature of the UK productivity problem and of the policy framework 
with which it should be addressed is contained in HM Treasury (2000). That 
document includes a detailed description of both the labour productivity gap and 
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its proximate sources, together with a review of the policy implications derived 
from an analysis of market failures related to productivity performance, which 
focuses on five priorities — namely, increasing investment in physical capital, 
developing human capital, promoting innovation and research and development 
(R&D), strengthening competition, and encouraging enterprise and 
entrepreneurship (HM Treasury, 2000, p. 58). 
This paper develops a framework for thinking about productivity which is 
used both to clarify and to appraise the Treasury view of productivity in the UK. 
This requires an appropriate theoretical structure within which not only to 
understand the determinants of productivity outcomes but also to interpret the 
productivity evidence. It is important to consider the microeconomics of firms’ 
decisions that impact on productivity and also to appreciate that productivity 
comparisons need to be set in a theoretical framework. Recent developments in 
growth economics are an important ingredient in this endeavour, but so also is an 
awareness of the empirical evidence. 
Traditionally, international comparisons were usually made in terms of labour 
productivity, which will be positively influenced by the availability of other 
factors of production such as the amount of physical and human capital per hour 
worked. More recently, comparisons of total factor productivity (TFP) have also 
been widely used. Estimates of TFP attempt to identify the component of labour 
productivity performance that is accounted for not by factor inputs but by the 
efficiency and technology with which labour is used. The methodology used to 
attribute labour productivity to these proximate sources is growth accounting. 
This technique, which can be regarded as a flexible but disciplined way of 
benchmarking these various contributions to labour productivity and thus of 
quantifying the apparent strengths and weaknesses of an economy, is central to 
the analysis of the UK productivity problem in HM Treasury (2000). 
Interpretation of the results of growth accounting requires explicit recognition 
of its growth theoretic foundations. Originally, these lay in the traditional neo-
classical (Solow) growth model, but the technique can be adapted to 
accommodate the new growth economics, although this does make matters more 
complicated. For example, the effects of technological change, which show up 
simply in TFP in the Solow model, will partly be attributed to capital within an 
endogenous innovation growth model. Thus, while growth accounting is 
potentially a powerful diagnostic tool, inferences of underlying supply-side 
capabilities are not entirely straightforward. 
This methodology is reviewed in Section II. In Section III, we go on to 
consider detailed estimates from growth accounting exercises. Our objective is to 
address the following two questions: 
1.  How should growth accounting comparisons of UK productivity performance 
be interpreted? UK Productivity Performance 
273 
2. What have been the proximate sources of the gap between the productivity 
performance of the UK and that of its peer group? 
The answers that we obtain provide insights into two much discussed issues — 
namely, the extent to which the radical change in UK supply-side policy after the 
1970s has made a difference and the role that the information and 
communications technology (ICT) revolution has played in recent productivity 
outcomes. 
The impact of incentive structures on investment and innovation has become 
an important theme in current government thinking about productivity. It is also 
central to the new growth economics, much of whose genuine novelty lies in its 
exploration of the microeconomic foundations of economic growth. This 
literature suggests, on the one hand, that productivity performance should be 
understood in terms of the profit-maximising decisions of firms, which will be 
concerned, inter alia, about the appropriability of returns. On the other hand, 
growth economics is also aware of the possible importance of agency problems 
within firms in the context of the separation of ownership and control, which 
may overturn some of the apparent policy implications of the early work in 
endogenous growth. 
Section IV explores these issues and argues that they are fundamental to the 
general stance of government attempts to stimulate productivity, especially with 
regard to the balance between competition and industrial policy. In Section V, 
we go on to evaluate the government’s productivity policy framework as set out 
in HM Treasury (2000). Our objective is to address two further questions: 
3.  How do incentive structures impact on growth? 
4. Is the government’s stance on productivity appropriate in the light of recent 
theory and evidence? 
If incentives matter, it is also important to recognise that economic policy is 
made by politicians who may often dislike the possible electoral consequences of 
productivity improvement. Section V considers some implications of this, given 
that excellent productivity performance involves continual entry and exit of 
firms, restructuring and job losses and that some policy decisions with major 
productivity impacts are not discussed at all in HM Treasury (2000). 
II. MEASUREMENT OF AND ACCOUNTING FOR 
PRODUCTIVITY PERFORMANCE 
The most readily available and hence most commonly cited measure of a 
country’s relative well-being is GDP per capita. This measure has the most direct 
bearing on average standards of living. From an economist’s point of view, 
however, productivity is more readily defined as output per units of productive Fiscal Studies 
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inputs; hence economists’ use of alternative definitions such as GDP per person 
engaged, GDP per hour worked or GDP per unit of multiple inputs.  
GDP per capita (GDPC) is calculated comparing country J with the UK using 
the formula 
(1)  () () ,







where Y is the nominal value of output, P is an aggregate price index of the 
goods and services produced and POP is population. An analogous formula can 
be employed to compare GDP per capita growth over time.  
Labour productivity measures are calculated by replacing POP in equation 1 
by employment (E) or total hours worked (L). Differences between GDP per 
capita and GDP per person engaged reflect the extent of labour force 
participation and unemployment rates. GDP per hour worked takes account 
additionally of deviations from the standard working week due to part-time 
working, paid holidays, etc.  
1. Total Factor Productivity 
The above partial productivity measures do not incorporate substitution among 
factor inputs; this is taken into account by calculating total factor productivity.
1 
In considering productivity estimates with multiple inputs, we begin with a 
production function given by 
(2) ( , ) QF A = X , 
where Q is real output (Q = Y/P), A is the level of TFP and X is a vector of i 
aggregate factor inputs including labour, capital and intermediate inputs. 
Increases in A can be interpreted as costless improvements in productive 
potential, whereas payment has to be made for additional factor inputs. 
Genuinely higher A can result from technical change viewed as (exogenous) 
‘manna from heaven’, from externalities or from better use of paid factor inputs. 
Measurement error may lead to apparently higher A, in particular where some 
aspects of factor accumulation are not recorded accurately. 
Taking logs, letting the symbol ^ represent proportionate rates of change of a 
variable and dividing by Q gives an equation for technical change, g: 
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where 
i X F  is the (social) marginal product of input Xi. If the technology is Hicks 
neutral, so that F(A,X) = AF(X), and there are no other sources of improvement 
in TFP, then  A g ˆ = . The implementation of equation 3 involves either the use of 
index numbers, where it is assumed that factor prices measure social marginal 
products, or econometric estimation of 
i X F . TFP growth in period t relative to 
period  t–s is most frequently calculated using the Törnqvist discrete 
approximation to the Divisia index (for example, Jorgenson, Gollop and 
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where αi(t,t–s) is the share of input i in the value of output averaged over t and  
t–s. The assumptions underlying this result include that the production function 
exhibits constant returns to scale and that product and factor markets are 
competitive so that all inputs in the production process are paid their marginal 
products. Hence the sum of factor shares exhausts all returns from pursuing that 
activity, implying Σiαi = 1. 
Analogously, we can define TFP levels in country J relative to the UK by the 
following Törnqvist index: 
(5) 
,, ,, ln( ) ln( ) ln( )
JU K JU K JU K JU K
ii
i
TFP Y X α =− ∑ , 
where Y
J,UK denotes relative output, 
, JU K
i X  is the relative quantity of input Xi and  
, JU K
i α  is the share of factor input i in the value of output averaged over the two 
countries.  
2. Interpreting Growth Accounting 
Although the growth accounting equations are based on somewhat restrictive 
assumptions, they are capable of taking into account a range of factors that 
influence output. The most commonly employed refinement of the method is to 
incorporate variations in the quality as well as the quantity of factor inputs using 
the method developed by Jorgenson and Griliches (1967), which weights types 
of inputs by their shares in total income. This method has been employed in 
various contexts to take account of changes in the quality of labour input, in 
particular educational attainment (Jorgenson and Fraumeni, 1989). Thus, for 
example, with l distinct types of labour, aggregate labour input, L, in equation 5 Fiscal Studies 
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is replaced by 
,, , ln( )
l
JU K JU K JU K
LL l l L αα ∑ . If one country employs more skilled 
labour, which commands higher wage premiums, then some part of the 
differential productivity in the two countries will be assigned to greater use of 
the higher-quality labour input. Without this adjustment, the differences in 
labour quality are subsumed under differences in TFP. Similarly, changes in the 
quality of capital input — for example, greater investment in ICT equipment — 
can be incorporated within the same framework. 
The model underlying the calculations in equations 4 and 5 is the neo-
classical growth model, originating in Solow (1956), or, where human capital is 
included as an additional factor input, is the Augmented-Solow model of 
Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992). But the theory of economic growth has moved 
in new directions with the publication of many papers on endogenous growth in 
the 1980s and 1990s. This poses the question of to what extent the growth 
accounting calculations need to be modified or even replaced in the light of these 
new theoretical developments.  
Whereas the Solow and Augmented-Solow models embodied diminishing 
returns to capital accumulation, the first generation of endogenous growth 
models emphasised increasing returns models, whereby productivity rises with 
cumulative knowledge or experience, thus creating spillovers from investment in 
capital, broadly defined to include physical capital, human capital or research 
activities; see, for example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995).  
Suppose the aggregate production function is Cobb-Douglas, relating output, 
Q, to k types of broad capital, K1,…,Kk, labour input, L, and exogenous technical 
change, A: 
(6) 
α β L K A Q
k
k ∑ = . 
With no spillovers, α+Σ kβk  = 1. Taking logs, letting the symbol ^ represent 
proportionate rates of change of a variable and subtracting L from both sides 
gives an expression for the change in labour productivity:  
(7)  ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ () kk
k
QL K L A β −= − + ∑ . 
Thus changes in capital deepening and TFP will have an impact on labour 
productivity, but TFP growth in this framework is unaffected by changes in the 
use of various forms of capital. Suppose, however, that each form of capital has 
spillover effects so that the β coefficients have two components — γ, which 
captures the private benefits of capital accumulation, and η, which captures 
external benefits. Suppose also that α+Σ kγk = 1, so that there are no internal 
increasing returns. Then technical progress is given by UK Productivity Performance 
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k k L K L K L Q A ) ˆ ˆ ( ) ˆ ˆ ( ) ˆ ˆ ( ˆ η γ . 
The growth accounting calculation measures the rate of change of underlying 
technical change by  ˆ* A , given by 
(9)  ∑ − + =
k
k k L K A A ) ˆ ˆ ( ˆ * ˆ η , 
which includes both exogenous and endogenous (spillover) components. In this 
case, measured TFP is affected both by capital deepening and by differences in 
the extent of spillovers across types of capital. Econometric estimation is 
required to separate external effects of investment in all forms of capital from 
exogenous technical progress.  
What is the empirical evidence on spillover effects? The empirical evidence 
hitherto suggests small or insignificant spillovers from physical capital (Oulton 
and Young, 1996), although it has been conjectured that there are likely to be 
spillovers from ICT capital, such as network externalities, that benefit economic 
agents other than those who own the technology (Schreyer, 2000). To date, there 
is no consensus on the extent of external benefits from human capital. Most 
authors claim that there are likely to be positive spillovers, but this remains a 
matter of some dispute.
2 
There is, however, ample evidence of large effects on output growth from 
R&D expenditures (for example, Griliches (1998), Griffith, Redding and Van 
Reenen (2000) and O’Mahony and Vecchi (2000)) and that these are greater than 
the coefficients that would be derived in a growth accounting exercise treating 
R&D as a form of capital. Thus there is consensus that spillovers from R&D 
activity are significant. 
The impact on output from innovative activities has been implemented 
differently in more recent, endogenous innovation, variants of endogenous 
growth models. Barro (1999) sets out the implications for growth accounting of 
the endogenous innovation literature, including both the product-varieties 
models of Romer (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991) and the quality-
ladders models of Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman and Helpman 
(1991). In the product-varieties model, the production function is given by 
(10) 
11 QA LNK
αα α −− = , 
where N is the number of varieties of capital goods, kj is the service flow from 
the jth type of capital good and K = Nk is the flow of service from the aggregate 
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capital stock. Innovation raises N over time. The growth accounting equation 
becomes 
(11)  N A K L Q g ˆ ) 1 ( ˆ ˆ ˆ ) 1 ( ˆ α α α − + = − − − = , 
where  ) ˆ ˆ ( ˆ k N K + = α α . If N depends on the flow of new R&D expenditures, 
then the latter would appear in the residual but with a different interpretation 
from that in the spillover model. 
As with the spillover model, the Solow residual measure of TFP growth 
captures contributions both from exogenous technological change and from the 
endogenous expansion of varieties of capital goods. However, the expansion of 
the number of varieties also makes a remunerated contribution to growth, which 
shows up through the embodiment of technological advance in new capital 
goods. Thus a fraction 1− α of the endogenous component of technological 
change is in TFP but a fraction α is in the capital contribution to growth. The 
alternative, quality-ladders formulation, in which technological change is 
experienced as an improvement in the quality rather than the number of capital 
goods, yields exactly analogous results. 
If there is endogenous innovation with embodiment in new capital goods, the 
residual tends to understate the contribution of technological change to growth, 
and this undermeasurement tends to be larger the greater is the endogenous 
component in technology. But, in principle, this could be taken into account 
using the input quality adjustment of Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) outlined 
above. An approach to growth accounting along these lines has been 
implemented by several authors in the context of trying to pinpoint the 
contribution of ICT to recent US economic growth (for example, Jorgenson and 
Stiroh (2000) and Oliner and Sichel (2000)). In this work, the US ICT 
experience appears to be a case where important technological changes raise the 
growth rate primarily through the remunerated contribution of new varieties of 
capital and through faster TFP growth in ICT production itself, rather than 
through a general economy-wide impact on TFP. 
It should be noted that, in the short term, capacity may not be optimally 
adjusted. This may be because there are fixed factors of production such that the 
economy is not on the long-run cost curve and/or because forecasting errors lead 
to incorrect investment and labour hiring decisions. This would imply both that 
TFP growth as conventionally measured would not correspond to technical 
change even in the traditional Solow model and that more sophisticated 
estimation methods are required to distinguish these different impacts (Morrison-
Paul, 1999). It seems highly likely that it is important to take this into account 
when considering TFP growth in the UK, especially in the context of the 
turbulent conditions of the 1970s and 1980s. For example, Lynde and Richmond 
(2000) estimate that a substantial part of the improvement in manufacturing TFP UK Productivity Performance 
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growth in the 1980s relative to the 1970s resulted from reduced cost inefficiency 
rather than faster technical change. 
Abramovitz (1956) famously describes the TFP residual ‘as a measure of our 
ignorance’; in practice, many influences on output growth remain hidden in the 
residual term. This continues to be a drawback of the growth accounting method. 
In theory, regression methods have an advantage in that they can identify the 
variables that influence the residual, although including general variables such as 
R&D expenditures in a regression would not help to identify the underlying 
model (spillovers versus endogenous innovation). Also, over the past few 
decades, increasing awareness of statistical problems such as endogeneity and 
the development of sophisticated econometric techniques have resulted in a 
myriad of estimates of factors that affect output growth. These estimates are 
often sensitive to the techniques chosen and the specification of the production 
function. For example, the literature is far from reaching a consensus on the 
impact of R&D expenditures (Mairesse and Sassenou, 1991; Griliches, 1998). 
Moreover, while it is correct that growth accounting cannot fully explain why 
growth rates differ whereas potentially a well-designed cross-country regression 
analysis might shed light on this (Temple, 1999, p. 121), it is also true that 
growth accounting is an important corrective to misleading impressions from 
growth regressions. Thus growth accounting shows that the apparently 
miraculous growth performance of the Asian Tigers suggested by growth 
regressions (World Bank, 1993) actually stems very largely from a demographic 
transition that has substantially raised labour inputs per person through age 
structure effects and from high capital stock growth relative to investment shares 
of GDP stemming from initially very low capital/output ratios. Very rapid 
growth in these countries has resulted mainly from growth of factor inputs (both 
labour and capital) rather than from TFP growth, which has been mediocre rather 
than outstanding (Crafts, 1999). 
Despite its limitations, the growth accounting framework, with its grounding 
in economic theory and its independence from statistical problems, is a useful 
method of describing and benchmarking performance. Labour productivity 
outcomes are seen as depending upon the availability of complementary factors 
of production, such as physical capital, together with the state of technology and 
the efficiency with which productive resources are utilised. TFP, as measured in 
practice, is an important diagnostic in international comparisons but, in general, 
contrary to common belief, is not to be interpreted as an index of technological 
progress. 
III. THE UK’S RELATIVE PRODUCTIVITY PERFORMANCE 
This section considers the empirical evidence on the UK’s productivity 
performance relative to some of its major competitors. There are a number of 
problems involved in the measurement of productivity and its components, Fiscal Studies 
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including which price deflators to use to compare output across countries and 
how to measure physical and human capital in an internationally consistent 
manner, as well as a host of data measurement issues. These issues are covered 
in detail in O’Mahony (1999) and so are not replicated here. But this is not to 
say that data measurement considerations are unimportant; our estimates are only 
as good as the underlying data, and the reader should be aware that there are 
serious limitations in official statistics, not least of which is poor measurement 
of output in service sectors. Nevertheless, it is likely that these problems beset 
official statistics in all countries, so international comparisons may be less 
sensitive to these criticisms. 
1. GDP Per Capita and Labour Productivity 
Table 1 shows levels of GDP per capita and labour productivity for 1995 and 
1999, comparing the UK with some of its major competitors. Currently, GDP per 
capita is much higher in the USA than in the three European countries shown or 
Japan. When productivity is measured per hour worked, a significant gap 
emerges between the UK on the one hand and the USA, France and Germany on 
the other, with Japan showing the lowest productivity level of the five countries.  
Differences between GDP per capita and GDP per hour worked reflect 
differences in unemployment rates, labour force participation and annual hours 
worked per employee. The US lead in per capita output reflects the traditionally 
much lower unemployment rates in the USA than in Europe and the greater 
willingness of its citizens to participate in productive activities. Also, employees 
generally work longer hours in the USA than in the UK and considerably so 
relative to workers in France and Germany. In the latter two countries, rising 
living standards were reflected in a greater preference for increased leisure in the 
form of more paid holidays. Workers in Japan are employed for the longest 
numbers of hours annually of the five countries considered. 
In the second half of the 1990s, the US lead in terms of GDP per capita has 
increased, and the USA has also gained ground in terms of labour productivity. 
Within Europe, there has not been much change in the relative position of the 
three countries. Japan’s position has deteriorated relatively in recent years, 
reflecting both the end of catch-up growth in that country and well-reported 
regional problems in Asia.  
Table 1 also shows relative output per hour worked in the market sectors, i.e. 
excluding activities such as health, education and government services where 
output is both difficult to measure and difficult to compare across countries. 
Using market output as the numerator puts the USA well above the three 
European countries by 1999 but does not alter the UK’s poor relative standing. 
Post-war growth rates for the aggregate economy for selected periods are also 
shown in Table 1. Since the UK started the post-war period with labour   
 UK Productivity Performance 
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TABLE 1 
The UK’s Relative Labour Productivity Position 
  UK USA  France  Germany  Japan 
1995 (UK = 100)       
GDP per capita  100  142  104  105  116 
GDP per hour worked  100  122  126  112  93 
Market output per hour  100  124  120  115  79 
        
1999 (UK = 100)        
GDP per capita  100  148  105  104  112 
GDP per hour worked  100  126  124  111  91 
Market output per hour  100  133  121  114  n.a. 
        
Growth rates (% p.a.)       
GDP per hour worked:       
1950–99  2.53 1.67 3.53 3.65 4.23 
1950–73  2.99 2.34 4.62 5.18 6.11 
1973–99  2.13 1.08 2.56 2.29 2.78 
1989–99  1.92 1.47 1.32 1.87 2.70 
1995–99  1.30 2.08 1.16 1.15 1.22 
Notes: German growth rates prior to 1993 refer to area of the Federal German Republic. Market sectors exclude 
non-market services (education, health and government services). Value added and employment (including 
self-employed) are taken from each country’s National Accounts, incorporating recent revisions. The 
calculation of average annual hours worked considers the extent of the average working week and allows for 
part-time working and time lost per year due to paid or unpaid holidays, sickness, maternity and work 
stoppages such as strikes, short-time working, etc. Output is converted to a common currency using the ratio of 
price levels across countries for 1996, known as purchasing power parities (PPPs). For additional detail on 
methodology, see O’Mahony (1999). The estimates in this and subsequent tables differ in many respects from 
those in O’Mahony (1999) and earlier drafts of this paper. These changes are driven largely by substantial 
revisions to National Accounts and the use of 1996 rather than 1993 PPPs. In addition, estimates are now 
shown for unified Germany rather than for the former West Germany as in earlier drafts, which generally leads 
to a worsening of Germany’s relative position. Based on an attempt to update O’Mahony (1999), a reasonable 
guess is that, in 1999, the former West Germany would have real GDP per hour worked of about 128 (UK = 
100). 
 
productivity levels equal to about 55 per cent of US levels, compared with 40 per 
cent in France and Germany and 20 per cent in Japan (O’Mahony, 1999), we 
would expect catch-up growth to US levels to be less rapid in the UK than in 
these three countries. Over the entire post-war period, productivity growth in the 
UK was about 1 percentage point per annum greater than that in the USA but fell 
considerably short of the growth rates experienced in the remaining three 
countries. By 1999, labour productivity levels in Germany and France had 
overtaken UK levels by a considerable extent. Thus the UK experience cannot be 
entirely explained within a catch-up model.  
If the time period is split into the years from 1950 to 1973 and post-1973, 
growth rates of aggregate labour productivity are lower in the latter period in all 
countries, although the decline is less for the UK than for the other four Fiscal Studies 
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countries. The beginning of the period is also affected by post-war 
reconstruction, but starting the analysis in 1960 does not radically alter the 
picture. From 1979, since when the stance of supply-side policy has been 
markedly different, the UK has maintained its position against France and West 
Germany while continuing to close the gap with the USA. A similar picture 
emerges if attention is confined to the market economy, as discussed in 
O’Mahony (1999), although in all countries labour productivity tends to be 
higher using this measure than for total economy GDP. The upsurge in US 
labour productivity is a recent phenomenon — since 1995, annual growth rates 
have more than doubled over the average value achieved in the previous two 
decades.  
The results for the aggregate economy mask some differences at the sector 
level. Thus O’Mahony (1999), who presents trends and levels of output per hour 
by sector, shows the continuing lead in the USA in manufacturing, with only 
Japan catching up in recent years. In contrast, by 1996, both France and 
Germany had significant labour productivity leads over the UK in market service 
sectors. Historical evidence in Broadberry (1998) shows that, over the past 120 
years, the deterioration in the UK’s labour productivity performance relative to 
the USA has been heavily concentrated in services. Thus the focus on 
manufacturing as providing the driving force behind convergence of productivity 
needs to be switched to a greater focus on developments within services.  
2. Physical Capital and Total Factor Productivity 
We now turn to a consideration of the most readily measurable proximate source 
of growth — physical capital. As can be seen from Table 2, in 1999, for the total 
economy, levels of capital intensity (capital per hour worked) were highest in 
Japan, with the UK falling considerably behind all countries, even Germany 
(which inherited relatively little capital from the Eastern Länder). The UK’s poor 
relative position in 1995 was not as bad for the market economy as for the total. 
The estimates suggest that both the UK and the USA concentrate investment 
relatively less in non-market activities than the other three countries. 
Nevertheless, the UK’s capital intensity position remains inferior even in the 
market economy.  
Table 2 also shows growth rates for selected periods in the aggregate 
economy. In many respects, capital intensity growth rates over the long term 
mirror those for labour productivity. In general, the USA shows the lowest 
growth rates and Japan the highest. Capital deepening has occurred at a slower 
pace since 1973 in all countries. Also, capital intensity growth was higher in the 
market sectors than in the aggregate economy (O’Mahony, 1999). There are 
signs of improvement in the UK’s position in the past decade relative at least to 
the European countries, but it is too soon to say if this reversal of previous trends 
will persist. UK Productivity Performance 
283 
TABLE 2 
Relative Capital Intensity and Total Factor Productivity 
  UK USA  France  Germany  Japan
a 
1995 (UK = 100)         
Capital per hour (total economy)  100  136  160  139  160 
Capital per hour (market sectors)  100  126  127  130  113 
TFP (total economy)  100  111  109  101  77 
TFP (market sectors)  100  115  110  105  76 
         
1999 (UK = 100)         
Capital per hour (total economy)  100  142  146  132  165 
TFP (total economy)  100  113  109  100  77 
         
Total economy growth rates (% p.a.)         
Capital per hour           
  1950–99  3.74  2.20  3.59 3.84 5.70 
  1950–73  4.61  2.24  4.18 5.50 6.88 
  1973–99  2.97  2.17  3.07 2.37 4.79 
  1989–99  2.54  2.22  1.94 1.17 3.89 
  1995–99  1.00  2.48  0.88 0.49 1.20 
TFP         
  1950–99  1.23  1.01  2.29 2.74 2.14 
  1950–73  1.30  1.66  3.13 3.98 3.39 
  1973–99  1.17  0.43  1.55 1.64 1.18 
  1989–99  1.13  0.86  0.61 1.44 0.66 
  1995–99  0.88  1.42  0.84 0.97 0.80 
aThe comparisons with Japan only distinguish two asset types — equipment and structures. 
Notes: The perpetual inventory method was employed to measure net capital stocks. This is based on 
cumulating investments over periods of time and allowing for depreciation of assets, where it was assumed that 
depreciation rates followed a pattern of geometric decay. The depreciation rates were assumed to be common 
across countries, equal to those currently used in the US National Accounts. Five asset types were distinguished 
— computers, software, communications equipment, other equipment and structures. Data on real investment 
in ICT equipment including software for the UK were taken from Oulton (2001) and so incorporate the US 
hedonic price deflator for equipment. Similarly, the German estimates of ICT investment were based on US 
deflators, adjusted for exchange rate movements. An estimate of the capital stock for the former East Germany 
at unification was derived using the ratio of capital stocks for total Germany to former West Germany from the 
National Accounts. Data for the USA and France were obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 
and the Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques (INSEE), respectively. Capital services 
were then calculated by weighting each asset type by its user costs. Purchasing power parities for investment 
goods for 1996 were used in constructing international levels of tangible capital. 
 
Table 2 also shows relative levels and trends in one measure of TFP where 
labour productivity is adjusted for differences in physical capital intensity. Both 
the cross-country rankings and time pattern of the growth rates show similarities 
to those found for labour productivity. Over the long term, there is evidence of 
post-war convergence of TFP levels to those in the USA, with again the 
convergence rate being lower in the UK than in France, Germany or Japan. Also, Fiscal Studies 
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the UK does not experience the same decline in TFP growth rates post-1973 as is 
apparent for other countries. On this measure, Japan now looks no better than the 
continental European countries, confirming the often cited result that a large part 
of Japan’s advantage in labour productivity growth is due to considerably higher 
growth in capital intensity. The residual productivity gap between the UK and 
other countries in 1999 is about half that found for labour productivity but 
remains significant relative to the USA and France. By the end of the 1990s, TFP 
levels in Japan fall considerably below those achieved by other countries, despite 
its much higher growth in capital intensity. This raises the possibility that Japan 
has ‘overinvested’ in capital in the sense that the very low cost of capital by 
international standards encouraged investment in projects with very low 
marginal benefits.  
Thus far, we have only considered changes in aggregate capital intensity. 
Much of the recent literature on the impact of knowledge technology focuses on 
changes in capital quality (substitution of ICT capital for other forms). Estimates 
for the USA using growth accounting methods by Oliner and Sichel (2000), 
Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) and Whelan (2000) show significant impacts in 
recent years of ICT capital on output growth. Oliner and Sichel suggest that, 
between 1996 and 1999, about 1.1 percentage points of the 4 per cent per annum 
rise in US real output can be accounted for by a broad measure of ICT capital, 
which includes computer hardware, software and communications equipment. 
This is in contrast to estimates for earlier time periods, when the contribution of 
ICT was relatively small. Very rapid investment in new technology has increased 
its share in total capital to the extent that it is now a significant contributor to 
growth. This recent surge in the contribution of ICT to output growth is 
consistent with the high stock market valuations of high-technology firms.  
This raises the question of whether European countries will follow the US 
pattern of a significant impact of ICT on growth. A recent comprehensive study 
on measuring ICT’s contribution to UK productivity (Oulton, 2001), taking 
account of software and communications equipment as well as computer 
hardware, shows that in many respects the UK appears to be following the US 
pattern. ICT investment in the UK has been growing significantly in recent 
years, and its impact on output growth is beginning to appear, although its 
contribution is lower than in the USA, at about 0.7 of a percentage point. 
Estimates of the impact of ICT on relative labour productivity levels are 
presented in Table 5 below.  
3. Human Capital 
From the end of the 1970s, the existence of better data-sets on labour force 
qualifications allows a detailed look at human capital stocks comparing the UK  
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TABLE 3 
Stocks of Qualified Persons as a Percentage of Employees, 
by Skill Level and Relative Total Skills 
  Total economy  Market sectors 
  UK USA  Germany  France  UK USA  Germany 
1978–79            
Higher 6.8  15.8  7.0  9.4  5.0  11.1  3.8 
Intermediate  21.8 11.4  58.5  40.1 20.3 11.0  59.7 
Low or none  71.4  72.8  34.5  50.5  74.7  77.9  36.5 
Relative skills 
  (UK = 100) 
100.0 103.3  109.1  108.0 100.0 101.9  108.5 
            
1993            
Higher  13.5 22.1  11.4  11.0 10.6 17.1  7.6 
Intermediate  30.9 17.5  60.7  50.1 30.3 16.8  62.9 
Low or none  55.6  60.4  27.9  38.9  59.1  66.1  29.5 
Relative skills 
  (UK = 100) 
100.0 102.3  106.5  103.9 100.0 100.9  105.0 
            
1998            
Higher 16.6  24.1  13.5  16.4  —  —  — 
Intermediate 34.6  18.1  63.8  51.2  —  —  — 
Low or none  48.8  57.8  22.7  32.4  —  —  — 
Relative skills 
  (UK = 100) 
100.0 100.5  105.5  105.3  —  —  — 
Notes: 
Higher-level skills: USA — Bachelor degrees and above; UK — first degrees and above, membership of 
professional institutions; Germany — Hochschulabschluss and Fachhochschulabschluss; France — 0.25 of 
baccalauréat + 2 ans, Diplôme superior and En cour d’études initiales. 
Intermediate vocational qualifications: USA — Associates degrees and 50 per cent of those designated ‘some 
college but no degree’; UK — BTEC HNC/HND, teaching and nursing, BTEC ONC/OND, City & Guilds, 
apprenticeships; Germany — Meister/Techniker gleichwertig Fachschulabschluss, Lehr-/Anlehrausbildung 
gleichwertig Berufsfach-schulabschluss, berufliches Praktikum; France — Cap, BEP ou autre diplôme de ce 
niveau, baccalauréat, brevet professional ou autre diplôme de ce niveau and 0.75 of baccalauréat + 2 ans. 
Sources: 
1978–79 and 1993: USA — Survey of Current Population: Educational Attainment, US Department of Labor; 
UK — Labour Force Survey, OPCS; Germany — Mikrozensus, Statistisches Bundesamt; France — Sources 
d’Emploi, INSEE. 
1998 updates: Derived using information on growth in qualified employees between 1993 and 1998 from 
Mason (2000) for the UK, the Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1999 and the Statistisches Jahrbuch, 
1999. Data for 1978–79 and 1993 refer to the former West Germany whereas 1998 data refer to unified 
Germany. Skill proportions for 1995, available on both bases, showed little difference between West Germany 
and unified Germany. 
Relative skills: Derived by weighting the skill proportions by their relative remunerations — see O’Mahony 
(1999) for details on weights and sources. 
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with France, Germany and the USA.
3 The basic data are shown in Table 3, with 
workforce skills divided into three categories — higher-level qualifications 
(degree or above), intermediate qualifications (vocational qualifications above 
high school but below degree) and low or no skills. By the late 1970s, we see 
that the UK had a substantially smaller fraction of the labour force with higher-
level qualifications than the USA, but there was little difference between the UK 
and Germany at this level, with France marginally ahead of both. The data for 
market sectors suggest that the UK had proportionally fewer graduates employed 
in non-market services than either Germany or the USA.  
At the intermediate level, however, although the UK clearly had no shortfall 
relative to the USA, there was a massive skills gap between the UK and 
Germany and a substantial shortfall relative to France. These cross-country 
differences continued into the 1990s. During the 1980s and into the 1990s, there 
has been a significant expansion of higher education in the UK, so that by 1998 
the higher-level skills gap with the USA has been narrowed and the UK has 
pulled ahead of Germany. There has also been a significant expansion of 
vocational training in the UK, and the intermediate-level skills gap with 
Germany and France has narrowed, but Germany’s lead in this respect remains 
substantial. Similarly, the estimates of aggregate relative skills in Table 3, 
derived by weighting skill proportions by their relative remunerations in each 
country, show the UK falling behind all three countries in 1979 but catching up 
with the USA by 1998 and considerably reducing its shortfall with Germany and 
France also by that year. The policy changes that have been implemented in the 
UK cannot bring instantaneous results, and it takes a long time before changes in 
the flow of investment in human capital feed through to significant changes in 
the stocks of qualified workers.  
Mechanisms by which skills can affect productivity are discussed in a series 
of studies, carried out over a number of years at the National Institute of 
Economic and Social Research (NIESR), comparing matched samples of 
production plants in the UK against those in competitor countries. In 
summarising the findings for European countries, Prais (1995) concludes that 
production today requires firms to produce a greater range of specialised 
products to meet the specialised needs of customers (flexible specialisation) and 
to do so on specialised machinery appropriate for small batches of variants. This 
requires greater skills in the choice of machinery, operating it effectively and 
maintaining it in good working order. In comparisons between European 
countries and the USA, Mason and Finegold (1997) suggest that, in the USA, 
graduate manufacturing engineers play a key role in instigating incremental 
process innovations and improvements in US plants. More generally, graduate 
engineers represent key components of the traditional US mass production 
                                                                                                                                    
3The situation in 1979 reflects a history of different strategies of capital accumulation across these countries; 
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system, with prime responsibility for planning, assisting and improving the work 
of semi-skilled employees.  
4. R&D and Innovation 
The most readily available measures of innovative activities are R&D 
expenditures, shown relative to output in Table 4. Using aggregate GDP as the 
denominator shows the UK with the lowest ratios in recent years, suggesting 
some UK deficit in R&D activity. But using GDP as the denominator may be 
misleading, as most R&D activity is carried out in manufacturing, whose 
importance varies across countries.
4 The R&D/output ratios for manufacturing, 
available only up to 1996, suggest very little difference between the three 
European countries in most of the period, although again the UK has fallen 
behind in the 1990s. Table 4 also shows relative levels of R&D stocks/output 
ratios for 1996. On this measure, the UK falls considerably behind the USA,  
 
TABLE 4 
R&D Expenditures as Shares of Output 
(average over time periods) 
  UK USA  France  Germany
a Japan 
Total economy (%)         
1973–79 1.36  1.54  1.06  1.42  1.15 
1980–84 1.45  1.83  1.19  1.75  1.51 
1985–89 1.49  2.04  1.35  2.04  1.90 
1990–98 1.35  1.98  1.45  1.77  2.04 
         
Manufacturing (%)         
1973–79 4.61  6.34  3.95  3.77  3.51 
1980–84 6.13  8.31  4.85  5.17  4.95 
1985–89 5.73  9.28  5.73  6.16  6.44 
1990–96 5.94  8.39  6.61  6.37  7.37 
         
Relative R&D stocks/output, 1996        
Total economy  100  138  100  126  119 
Manufacturing 100  142  106  109  104 
aFormer West Germany. 
Note: The R&D/output ratio is very volatile and is highly influenced by the business cycle. Therefore averages 
over a number of years were calculated rather than presenting the data for selected years. 
Sources: R&D expenditures — Research and Development Expenditures in Industry, 1974–1998, OECD, 
Paris, 2000; nominal output — National Accounts, Volume II, OECD, Paris, 2000. R&D stocks are estimated 
using the perpetual inventory formula as given in the note to Table 2. This employs an assumption, common in 
the literature, of a constant 15 per cent depreciation rate (Mairesse and Sassenou, 1991). 
                                                                                                                                    
4Note that if there were significant externalities from R&D, then the whole-economy figure would be the more 
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Germany and Japan in the aggregate economy, but in manufacturing, only the 
gap with the USA is significant.  
5. Accounting for Relative Productivity: ICT, R&D and Skills 
Using a combination of growth accounting and econometric estimates, it is 
possible to explore ‘some of our ignorance’ regarding the TFP residual. Thus we 
can estimate the extent to which the productivity gap between the UK and other 
nations is due to lower levels of R&D expenditures, lower levels of ICT or less 
use of skilled labour.
5 The results are shown in Table 5, which brings together 
the data underlying Tables 1–4 with econometric estimates of R&D output 
elasticities from O’Mahony and Vecchi (2000). The table contrasts the position 
in 1979 with that in the mid- and late 1990s. These results should be seen as 
suggestive of the likely importance of the variables considered rather than as 
precise estimates of their quantitative significance. 
As discussed above, lower overall physical capital deepening explains a large 
proportion of the UK’s labour productivity gap with the USA, France and 
Germany in the 1990s, and capital was equally an important explanatory factor 
in 1979. Table 5 presents a division of the capital contributions into ICT and 
other assets. By 1995, and especially by 1999, some part of the UK’s labour 
productivity gap with the USA can be explained by the latter country’s greater 
investment in ICT equipment. Nevertheless, the contribution of traditional 
capital remains large. ICT capital intensity in Germany is about equal to that in 
the UK, with France lagging both. Hence the UK’s failure to invest to the same 
extent as competitor countries is not primarily a problem with new technology, 
since the UK performs no worse than other European countries in this respect. 
Rather, it is due to the UK’s poor investment record in more traditional capital, 
primarily non-ICT equipment.  
Using the growth accounting methodology, which weights each type of skill 
by its remuneration, shows that greater use of skilled labour in the USA explains 
some small amount of its lead over the UK in 1979 and only 2 percentage points 
of its lead in 1995, but that this has no explanatory power by 1999. Labour force 
skills have a somewhat greater impact in explaining the productivity lead of both 
Germany and France, but their contribution has declined over time. These 
calculations make no allowance for external benefits from skill acquisition. If 
external benefits affected all skills equally, then more of the gap with European 
countries could be explained by this factor input. If, on the other hand, external 
impacts were greater from investment in higher education, through, for example, 
facilitating the adoption of new technology including ICT, then skills would 
have a greater explanatory power in accounting for the US productivity lead.  
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However, the empirical evidence has not reached anything like a consensus on 
the existence or quantitative significance of likely spillovers from human capital 
accumulation. 
TABLE 5 
Relative Total Factor Productivity: Total Economy 
UK = 100 
  USA France  Germany
a 
1979     
Labour productivity  154  131  130 
TFP after adjusting for:       
 Physical  capital  132  114  121 
  Physical capital and skills
b 129  108  116 
  Above plus R&D — common returns
c 113  106  120 
  Above plus R&D — varying returns
d 122  111  111 
     
1995     
Labour productivity  122  126  112 
TFP after adjusting for:       
  Physical capital — ICT  119  126  111 
  Physical capital — total  111  109  101 
  Physical capital and skills
b 109  106  96 
  Above plus R&D — common returns
c 97  107  105 
  Above plus R&D — varying returns
d 104  100  99 
     
1999     
Labour productivity  126  125  111 
TFP after adjusting for:       
  Physical capital — ICT  121  128  111 
  Physical capital — total  113  109  100 
  Physical capital and skills
b 113  105  97 
  Above plus R&D — common returns
c 99  108  96 
  Above plus R&D — varying returns
d 107  101  100 
aFigures for 1979 refer to the former West Germany and for 1995 and 1999 to the total unified Germany. 
bRelative skill proportions from Table 3 were weighted by their relative remuneration and then multiplied by 
labour’s share of value added; see O’Mahony (1999) for details. 
cThe elasticity of output with respect to R&D stocks was assumed to be 0.12 in all countries, based on 
econometric evidence using an international sample of company accounts reported in O’Mahony and Vecchi 
(2000). 
dThe elasticity of output with respect to R&D stocks was assumed to vary across countries in line with 
estimates in O’Mahony and Vecchi (2000). This yielded elasticities of 0.083 for the USA, 0.15 for the UK, 
0.27 for France and 0.11 for Germany. 
Note: In both R&D calculations, labour’s and physical capital’s shares were adjusted to allow for double 
counting, i.e. some part of payments to labour and capital are included in R&D expenditures; labour’s share 
was reduced by 0.02 and capital’s by 0.04, based on figures available for the UK in Office for National 
Statistics (2000). Fiscal Studies 
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Assuming common R&D output elasticities across countries (R&D common 
returns in Table 5) suggests that the addition of R&D as an explanatory factor 
eliminates the US TFP advantage over the UK in the mid-1990s. Differences in 
R&D explain much less of the UK’s productivity position relative to the 
remaining countries. R&D was an important factor explaining the US lead over 
the UK (and by implication the US lead over France and Germany) also in 1979, 
but it accounted for proportionally less of the labour productivity gap at that 
time. 
The nature of R&D, however, suggests that assuming constant R&D 
elasticities would only be appropriate if these expenditures led to innovations 
that raised output in each country alone without generating spillovers across 
countries. At the other extreme, if all innovations were costlessly transferred 
across countries, then the geographical location would not matter and an R&D 
component should not appear in the productivity gap. In between these two 
positions is one where technology is transferable but requires expenditure of 
resources (R&D) to learn about new techniques and thus approach the 
technology frontier, as modelled in Griffith, Redding and Van Reenen (2000). In 
this case, R&D elasticities would be lower in the technological leader (the USA) 
than in other countries. Table 5 also shows the impact of R&D incorporating 
elasticities that vary across countries; in this case, R&D continues to explain a 
significant part of the USA’s productivity leadership over the UK but the 
unexplained proportion is now larger. These results on R&D suggest that the US 
lead over the UK may be significantly affected by differences in innovation rates 
rather than being primarily due to ICT and related new technology changes.  
Thus far, the paper has only discussed ICT as affecting labour productivity 
through capital deepening. However, more popular perceptions of the 
‘information revolution’ are consistent with a view that ICT also affects residual 
productivity — for example, through facilitating greater organisational change 
within the workplace. To date, the empirical evidence shows little support for 
significant external benefits from ICT. Probably the most widely quoted ICT 
scepticism is the paper by Gordon (2000) where he suggests that renewed 
optimism regarding the impact of the new economy may be misplaced. His 
calculations for the USA suggest that the acceleration in trend TFP growth in the 
late 1990s was largely confined to ICT-producing rather than ICT-using sectors, 
a result that was also found for an earlier period in Stiroh (1998). Oliner and 
Sichel (2000) also find an important contribution from ICT-producing sectors to 
TFP growth.  
However, an adequate consideration of the issue of externalities requires 
more detailed research on sectors that use ICT equipment intensively. Recently 
for the USA, Stiroh (2001) presents industry-level results that indicate 
significant productivity acceleration in ICT-using as well as ICT-producing 
sectors. For the UK, Kneller and Young (2001) point to significant TFP gains in 
recent years in business services, a significant user of ICT. It is also important to UK Productivity Performance 
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note that TFP growth is affected by a large number of influences, some of which 
may be temporary, that may swamp underlying impacts from ICT. In this 
context, Kneller and Young (2001) suggest that the recent slowdown in 
manufacturing productivity growth in the UK, most likely related to cyclical 
movements stemming from the high value of sterling, renders it difficult to 
measure significant impacts from ICT at the economy-wide level. To the extent 
that the TFP acceleration is located in the ICT-producing sectors, its impact will 
be lower in European countries than in the USA. Data in O’Mahony (1999) 
suggest that the share of economic activity accounted for by the ICT-producing 
sectors is about twice as large in the USA as in the UK, where it is, in turn, over 
twice as large as in Germany.  
In summary, the results in Table 5, combined with those in Tables 1 and 2, 
lead to the tentative conclusion that, relative to the European countries, the UK’s 
poor productivity standing can largely be explained by lower capital 
accumulation, both physical and human, with no impact from ICT equipment. 
The UK’s capital deficit has been reduced over time but continues to be large. 
On the other hand, the US lead over the UK is probably largely accounted for by 
greater innovative activity, with some small contribution from ICT capital 
deepening. Greater impacts from ICT through its effect on underlying TFP are 
not, at present, evident.  
IV. MICROECONOMICS OF PRODUCTIVITY PERFORMANCE 
Growth accounting indicates that capital accumulation and improved technology 
are important proximate determinants of labour productivity. In turn, these are 
the result of decisions to invest or to innovate, which are, of course, the very 
essence of microeconomic analysis, and it is natural to suppose that agents, when 
making them, will be responsive to incentive structures. This aspect of 
productivity performance has recently been central not only to the new growth 
economics but also to the Treasury report on UK productivity (HM Treasury, 
2000). This section explores some key impacts of economic incentives on 
productivity outcomes in the context of the empirical evidence of Section III. 
This paves the way for a review of the Treasury report in Section V. 
1. Choice of Technique 
Profit-maximising or cost-minimising firms will choose factor intensities of 
production based on relative factor prices. It follows that countries where capital 
is relatively cheap compared with labour will tend to use more capital-intensive 
techniques and thus experience higher labour productivity, ceteris paribus, as in 
Germany compared with the UK recently. However, this basic neo-classical 
analysis, while providing useful insights in many international comparisons, Fiscal Studies 
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needs to be extended to take account of bargaining between firms and their 
workers and also of transactions costs more generally. 
In the UK, work effort and staffing levels were traditionally the subject of 
formal negotiation between firms and their workers, productivity outcomes 
depended on bargaining power and industrial relations were important for UK 
productivity. Changes in the context of bargaining in the 1980s included rises in 
unemployment, which weakened workers’ exit options, anti-union legislation, 
which strengthened firms’ fallback positions, and greater competition in the 
product market, which reduced rents and raised the cost to the firm of accepting 
a lower level of effort. The evidence suggests that these changes in the 
bargaining environment had implications for productivity. Empirical support for 
this hypothesis can be found in Haskel (1991), who stresses the role of greater 
competition, and in Bean and Symons (1989), who highlight adverse 
employment shocks in labour productivity improvements. Most of the impact 
may have come through a temporary boost to manufacturing productivity growth 
as firms adjusted to a higher equilibrium productivity level (Crafts, 1991). 
A further aspect of the choice of technique turns on possible exposure to 
opportunistic behaviour in the context of irreversible investments where, once 
costs have been sunk (and consequently bargaining power has changed), hold-up 
problems may arise from actions by agents supplying complementary factors of 
production, by mafia or by government. In a UK context, with an idiosyncratic 
history of decentralised bargaining and weak legislative control which might be 
highly conducive to opportunistic behaviour, this once again highlights the 
possible impact of industrial relations. Denny and Nickell (1992) found that the 
presence of trade unions in UK manufacturing reduced investment by 28 per cent 
gross but only 16 per cent net in competitive and 3 per cent net in monopolistic 
firms, after allowing for offsets from wage and productivity feedbacks. 
2. Insights from Growth Economics? 
The advent of the new growth economics underlined the possibility that 
institutions or policies that affect the appropriability of returns to investment can 
have effects on the growth rather than just the level of labour productivity in the 
long run as in the traditional Solow model. The AK model with constant returns 
to investment in (broad) capital, which was fashionable in the early days of 
endogenous growth theory, embodies this property (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
1995). In this model, following the Ramsey Rule, the return to investment is 
equated to the return to consumption along the optimal growth path, and higher 
prospective returns to investment — for example, following a reduction in the 
fear of expropriation — raise the equilibrium growth rate of output per person 
given the rate of time preference and the elasticity of marginal utility with 
respect to consumption. UK Productivity Performance 
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Sadly, the key assumption of the AK model — that of constant returns to 
capital accumulation — is rejected by the data. It is now generally agreed that 
the evidence points clearly to the validity of the traditional assumption of 
diminishing returns (Temple, 1999). In that case, the prediction of the 
Augmented-Solow model rather than the AK model would apply and the long-
run effect of better appropriability of returns would be on the labour productivity 
level rather than its growth rate. However, the adoption of models using a 
broader concept of capital does imply that diminishing returns will be less severe 
and the transitory effects of stimulating capital accumulation last longer. 
A simple extension to the basic AK model is to allow productive government 
expenditures to enhance the return to capital while distortionary taxes lower it. 
Thus an increase in transfer payments financed by income taxes is growth-
reducing whereas a rise in government infrastructure spending financed by 
higher VAT raises the growth rate. Estimation of growth regressions in which 
the financing aspect of government spending is explicitly taken into account 
supports these hypotheses for the OECD countries. Kneller, Bleaney and 
Gemmell (1999) find that either increasing productive expenditures or reducing 
distortionary taxes by 1 per cent of GDP raised the growth rate by at least 0.1 of 
a percentage point per year. 
This suggests that policy under the Conservatives can be expected to have 
had mixed effects on capital intensity and thus on labour productivity. On the 
one hand, there was a switch from direct to indirect taxation, and distortionary 
tax revenues fell from 26.2 per cent of GDP in 1980 to 23.2 per cent in 1997, 
which compares with 26.9 per cent in Germany and 32.0 per cent in France 
(OECD, 1999). On the other hand, the public sector investment/GDP ratio fell by 
about 4 percentage points. There is no reason to have expected a large impact on 
the capital/labour ratio from Conservative policies and it is perhaps not 
surprising that there has been little change in the relative position of the UK 
since 1979. 
The main thrust of growth economics has shifted from the AK model to 
endogenous innovation theories. Since R&D involves fixed costs, imperfect 
competition is required to enable these to be recovered by successful innovators. 
Thus the usual formulation of these models allows greater market power to raise 
the profitability of research and the growth rate in line with a Schumpeterian 
view of innovation. As with the AK model, however, there are doubts about the 
empirical validity of the claim of endogenous growth and thus the suggestion 
that good policy can raise the steady-state growth rate. The issue turns on scale 
effects in R&D, on which the evidence is rather weak (Jones, 1999). 
Nevertheless, empirical evidence does strongly support the proposition that 
innovative effort responds to expected profitability (Jaffe, 1988). Imperfections 
of competition matter for innovation, as witness the role of patenting in 
pharmaceuticals. In general, however, the most important imperfections relate to 
lead times and learning advantages over rivals with high imitation costs (Levin et Fiscal Studies 
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al., 1987). However, a quite general finding in recent work is that greater 
(though less than perfect) competition promotes innovation (Blundell, Griffith 
and Van Reenen, 1999). Geroski (1990) finds, using data from the Science 
Policy Research Unit database on UK innovations, that, while the profitability 
impact of market power is per se positive, this is far outweighed by the 
implications of the absence of competition on managerial innovative effort. This 
suggests both that the simple Schumpeterian message of conventional 
endogenous innovation models is misleading and that the lack of interest of the 
Conservatives in strengthening competition policy may have been a mistake. 
3. Agency Costs 
Principal–agent problems arise in situations of asymmetric information and 
result from the non-alignment of the agent’s interests with those of the principal 
where effort is costly. Relationships between the owners of a firm and its 
managers and between employers and workers are possible examples that can 
impair productivity performance. The standard way of mitigating agency 
problems is through the use of incentivised contracts, although risk aversion on 
the part of agents typically implies that the optimal contract from the principal’s 
point of view has a reward rate of less than 100 per cent. 
The empirical evidence suggests that the impact of switching to incentivised 
contracts on worker productivity can be very substantial. Two well-designed 
studies illustrate this point very well. McMillan, Whalley and Zhu (1989) find 
that the switch from collective to individual responsibility in Chinese 
agriculture, whereby individual households were able to retain and sell 
production in excess of their quotas, increased effort by 56 per cent and total 
factor productivity by 32 per cent between 1978 and 1984. Lazear (1996) studies 
a US autoglass company that switched to piece-rates and finds that labour 
productivity rose by 36 per cent, a little over half of which came from higher 
output by the existing workforce and the rest from attracting more-able workers 
to join the firm. 
The role of agency problems in reducing UK productivity growth has been 
highlighted in the analysis of the impact of competition on corporate 
performance. Nickell (1996) notes that the theoretical argument for a positive 
relationship between competition and productivity outcomes is weak and 
ambiguous, but he suggests that reduction of the opportunities for low 
managerial effort in reducing costs is the most likely channel for such an effect. 
Greater opportunities to compare performance and greater sensitivity of profits 
to managers’ actions under competition permit the design of schemes with 
sharper incentives. However, a dominant external shareholder with a high degree 
of control and who is able to internalise much of the gain from close monitoring 
of managers may be able to perform a similar function. This is exactly what the  
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TABLE 6 
Policy Impact on the Rate of Technology Adoption 
  Profit-maximising firm  Conservative firm 
Competition policy  Negative  Positive 
Industrial policy  Positive  Negative 
 
empirical evidence suggests — reducing supernormal profits from 15 to 5 per 
cent of value added raises TFP growth in a sample of UK firms by 1 percentage 
point per year in the absence of, but has no effect in the presence of, a dominant 
external shareholder (Nickell, Nicolitsas and Dryden, 1997). 
The apparently favourable effect of competition on innovation is also 
probably best explained by costly managerial effort and imperfect monitoring by 
shareholders with asymmetric information. Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1997) 
provide the following tableau of the implications of agency costs for policy 
impacts on the adoption of new technology (see Table 6). 
For profit-maximising firms, industrial policy, which can be thought of in this 
context as government subsidies to innovation, speeds up technology adoption 
by raising its profitability, and a strong competition policy tends to reduce 
innovation by making it harder to appropriate returns to cover fixed costs. But if 
firms are ‘conservative’, with a separation of ownership from control where the 
private benefits of control to managers are sufficiently large and they are 
sufficiently impatient, then Aghion et al. (1997) show that managers will always 
seek to delay cost-reducing initiatives, subject to keeping the firm afloat. For this 
conservative firm, industrial policy cushions managers and subsidies reduce 
managerial innovative effort, whereas competition policy has the opposite effect. 
In an economy where most firms are conservative, putting substantial effort into 
competition policy rather than industrial policy will be indicated. 
The case for subsidising industrial investment is indeed undermined by 
evidence that it may reduce productivity growth, as would be the case if the 
economy comprised mainly ‘conservative’ firms. Nickell et al. (1997) find, in 
their sample of UK firms in the period 1985–94, that financial pressure raised 
productivity growth especially where competition was weak. Thus, when rents 
are 25 (5) per cent of value added, a rise in interest payments from 10 to 30 per 
cent of cash flow raises productivity growth by 1.7 (0.8) percentage points per 
year. This implies that subsidies can be expected to weaken seriously the 
impetus for cost-reducing effort by managers of firms because they reduce 
financial pressure. 
4. Privatisation and Productivity 
Privatisation was one of the Conservatives’ flagship policies and has had 
generally favourable productivity implications. An unweighted average of 12 
former nationalised industries experienced annual growth rates of real output per Fiscal Studies 
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worker of 1.3 per cent in 1972–80, rising to 5.6 per cent in 1980–88 and to 6.8 
per cent in 1988–97, compared with whole-economy labour productivity growth 
of 1.7 per cent, 2.3 per cent and 1.5 per cent per year in the same periods. Since 
privatisation, the unweighted average annual rate of decrease in real operating 
expenditure for all privatised activities has been 4.6 per cent per year (Europe 
Economics, 1998). 
The incentive-based approach to productivity helps to explain why a change 
of ownership, especially where deregulation and competition are also introduced, 
can be expected to raise productivity in the context of firm–worker bargaining 
over productivity and of agency costs. In terms of effort bargaining, privatisation 
changes the firm’s pay-off function to one in which profit displaces ‘social 
welfare’, resulting in an equilibrium bargain with fewer restrictive work 
practices (Haskel and Sanchis, 1995). Empirical evidence from the 1990 
Workplace Industrial Relations Survey confirms this prediction and shows that 
91 per cent of privatised workplaces experienced increased flexibility of 
workforce use, compared with 40 per cent of all establishments (Sanchis, 1997). 
Clearly, principal–agent problems potentially afflict both public and private 
sector firms. They are, however, likely to be more serious in the former. Partly, 
this may reflect the absence of competition (and takeover or bankruptcy threats), 
together with the difficulty of building adequate incentives into management 
remuneration, and is thus a more extreme version of the problems discussed by 
Nickell (1996) for private sector firms. In addition, however, when the 
monitoring of state enterprise brings no personal reward but some personal cost, 
it can be expected that monitoring intensity will be weaker for state enterprise. 
Empirical evidence for the UK is consistent with these predictions: whereas 
financial performance had no effect on the probability of top executives 
resigning or being fired under public ownership, after several years in the private 
sector there is a strong inverse relationship (Cragg and Dyck, 1999). 
Principal–agent problems can also be expected to matter in areas of the public 
sector other than state-owned enterprises. International comparisons suggest that 
education is an important case in point. Scores in internationally standardised 
tests of mathematics and science knowledge, in which UK performance in the 
mid-1990s was sadly mediocre, seem to be explained much more by institutional 
arrangements than by expenditure per pupil. Educational systems that encourage 
competition rather than entrenching monopoly of provision, that embody 
performance tests external to the individual school and in which teachers do not 
control the curriculum achieve significantly better educational outcomes 
(Wössmann, 2000). 
The international comparisons through time reported in Table 5 suggest that, 
relative to both the USA and Germany, TFP gaps have narrowed since 1979 in 
the UK when explicit account is taken of stocks of R&D and skills. On balance, 
that table seems to indicate that the changed emphasis after 1979 in supply-side 
policy away from industrial policy and protectionism towards deregulation and UK Productivity Performance 
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greater openness may have been conducive to greater efficiency in the use of 
factors of production. A gap remains relative to European countries related to 
skills, and the TFP gaps directly attributable to R&D have not been reduced. 
The new growth economics argues that well-designed government policy 
operating through microeconomic foundations may be able to raise productivity 
growth. This is an important development in economic thought. However, some 
of the messages that are often taken from this literature seem, on further 
consideration, to be quite misleading. For example, subsidising physical capital 
may appear attractive in basic versions of the AK growth model, but it is much 
less appealing given the evidence on diminishing returns and absence of 
externalities and still less attractive when managers of firms are free of effective 
shareholder control. Similarly, the apparent endorsement of Schumpeterian 
claims that market power is good for innovation and growth in the standard 
endogenous innovation model deserves to be resisted on the basis of the 
evidence of innovative behaviour in UK industry. 
V. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PRODUCTIVITY POLICY 
This section reviews the recent statement in HM Treasury (2000) of the 
government’s approach to the UK productivity problem in the light of the ideas 
and evidence that we set out above. It also considers some political obstacles to 
the development and implementation of a more effective policy. 
1. Productivity in the UK: The Government’s Approach 
The central theme of the government policy framework is to create the right 
environment for firms to maximise their productivity potential. This is based on 
two pillars — namely, providing macroeconomic stability and pursuing a 
microeconomic reform agenda to correct market failure (HM Treasury, 2000, p. 
1). Underlying this approach is a diagnosis that inferior labour productivity has 
resulted from inadequate investment in physical and human capital and in R&D. 
The details of the government’s strategy to address this include plans to more 
than double public sector investment by 2003–04, a strengthening of competition 
policy through the Competition Act that came into force in March 2000, more 
generous tax treatment of R&D by small and medium-sized enterprises, together 
with restructuring of capital gains and corporation taxes, and, in macroeconomic 
policy, the delegation of monetary policy to the Monetary Policy Committee of 
the independent Bank of England. The document is also striking in its implicit 
(sometimes explicit) rejection of many of the policies that previous Labour 
governments used. Thus there is no return to ‘picking winners’ or attempts to 
create ‘national champions’, across-the-board subsidies for physical investment 
are not on the agenda and there is no suggestion that policy should target the 
reversal of deindustrialisation. Fiscal Studies 
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This analysis and policy framework are, in many ways, consistent with our 
review of the evidence. The account of the proximate sources of the UK 
productivity gap is right to stress that both investment and innovation have 
continued to lag. It is accepted that incentive structures have effects on growth 
performance. The strong emphasis on competition rather than industrial policy 
makes sense, given the evidence of weakness of shareholder control in UK firms. 
The move towards more favourable tax treatment of R&D rather than physical 
investment is in line with the literature on spillover effects. Additional spending 
on infrastructure and education could have a positive impact on labour 
productivity growth in the medium term. 
Yet, earlier sections of this paper indicate that there are also some notable 
lacunae. These concern, in particular, the failure to discuss the overall design 
rather than the detail of fiscal policy, a distinct reticence in discussing agency 
problems in the public sector and a rather narrow view of the channels whereby 
macroeconomic policy can impact on productivity. 
Kneller (2000) analyses the potential impact of the earlier package of 
increased public expenditure on education, health and infrastructure proposed in 
the 1998 Comprehensive Spending Review in terms of the AK model, relying on 
estimated coefficients of productive government expenditures and distortionary 
taxes to infer the possible long-run impact on growth, while explicitly taking into 
account the financing implications. He estimates that the combined net effect 
would be to raise the growth rate by 0.1 of a percentage point per year. The 
result assumes that 70 per cent of the extra spending is financed by distortionary 
taxes (corresponding to the average pattern of tax revenues in 1998), which 
reduces growth by 0.39 of a percentage point; the spending interventions alone 
would have a gross positive effect of 0.49 of a percentage point. 
These results should not be given too much weight, given that there is no 
consensus in this area. They do, however, highlight the need for a broader 
consideration of the role of fiscal policy in productivity growth than is 
undertaken in HM Treasury (2000). They underline the importance of 
considering the tax implications of government spending in assessing the 
productivity impacts and also suggest that, if there were greater willingness to 
use indirect taxation — for example, by broadening the VAT base — the impact 
of fiscal policy on growth might be more substantial. More generally, this 
reminds us of a big question that is ducked in the Treasury report — namely, 
whether a move to a more typical European pattern of public expenditure and 
taxation would have adverse effects on economic growth, as would be implied 
by the empirical findings in Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell (1999). 
The government is placing substantial emphasis on the positive impact of 
additional education spending on productivity. The discussion in HM Treasury 
(2000, p. 35) is clearly aware that the impact of this additional funding will 
depend on how well it is used and suggests that it is important that extra 
spending is linked to the achievement of performance targets. Yet, US UK Productivity Performance 
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experience suggests that it would be unwise to believe that this is an adequate 
response to the principal–agent problems that characterise the sector. More 
attention may need to be given to increasing the role of competition among 
producers within the state sector, which has been shown to have a strong impact 
on school productivity in the USA, admittedly within a context of local rather 
than centralised public finance (Hoxby, 1996). 
Indeed, given that the government’s view that competition is good for 
productivity in the private sector implies a belief that principal–agent problems 
matter, it would seem natural to go on to explore the role that greater exposure to 
competitive pressures might play in enhancing public sector productivity where 
issues of agency costs may be more serious. The Treasury report is silent on 
these issues, but it is to be hoped that this omission is rectified in future. 
The new macroeconomic policy regime has not so far been characterised by 
the severe recessions in GDP of the previous 25 years. Of itself, this may well be 
good for investment and productivity growth. The empirical investigation in 
Oulton (1995) offers some support and suggests that trend growth might be 
increased by up to 0.5 of a percentage point per year if macro fluctuations 
became more similar to those in the better-performing countries in the OECD. 
The macroeconomic turbulence of the 1970s and early 1980s seems to have led 
to weak productivity outcomes in manufacturing, which were later reversed as 
errors in employment and investment decisions were corrected (Darby and 
Wren-Lewis, 1991). 
It seems quite possible that a somewhat similar problem has afflicted 
manufacturing in the mid- to late 1990s through a large increase in the value of 
the pound and uncertainty as to the future exchange rate regime. Making the 
Bank of England independent has not addressed this aspect of macroeconomic 
instability, and the lack of clarity of the government’s true intentions with regard 
to EMU may have been an important ingredient in the stagnation of 
manufacturing labour productivity between 1994 and 1998. This aspect of 
macroeconomic management is not, however, dealt with in HM Treasury (2000). 
What seems to emerge from this review is that there are important areas that 
should be covered in the productivity policy framework if a complete discussion 
were to be provided but that are politically too difficult. This is not, of course, 
surprising, but it does suggest that the report errs in focusing solely on market 
failure while ignoring government failure. 
2. Government Failure 
Whereas 30 years ago discussions of market failure typically assumed that 
government intervention would solve the problem, more recently it is usual also 
to consider the likelihood of government failure. If politicians are concerned 
with maximising votes, it is possible not only that policies that would raise 
economic efficiency and productivity will not be implemented but also that Fiscal Studies 
300 
damaging interventions will be made. Time inconsistency is an aspect of this 
and, thus, credible commitment matters in microeconomic as well as 
macroeconomic policy. 
At the micro level, a central aspect of the incentive structures facing policy-
makers is that it may often be the case that there are votes to be lost by pursuing 
policies that promote economic efficiency and higher productivity. A classic 
example, well known to all who have studied international economics, is the 
attraction of protectionism to vote-seeking politicians, despite its generally 
adverse impact on productivity growth and overall economic welfare (Magee, 
1994). Such policies heavily reward relatively small but well-organised and 
easily identified groups of producers at the expense of small losses per person 
for a large but disparate group of consumers for whom it is too expensive to 
organise a protest. 
This problem is, however, much more general in the context of technological 
change, where productivity growth involves processes of creative destruction. 
New types of jobs appear, others disappear. Similarly, intensification of 
competition that stimulates the rationalisation of production through the 
elimination of inefficient activities and cost-reducing mergers leads to displaced 
workers who need to be redeployed through the labour market. In such cases, job 
losses are good news in terms of productivity but are rarely acclaimed as such by 
the press or by politicians. 
As HM Treasury (2000) notes, restructuring has played a major role in 
manufacturing productivity growth in the recent past in both the UK and the 
USA. An analysis by Disney, Haskel and Heden (2000) finds that entry and exit 
of establishments directly accounted for about half of labour productivity growth 
in UK manufacturing during 1980–92. In so far as this also implies an 
intensification of competition for incumbents, this estimate tends to understate 
the importance of restructuring because indirect effects on surviving firms’ 
productivity are not included. Clearly, productivity improvement will often be 
painful politically. 
Slowing down or blocking exit of the inefficient or outmoded is therefore a 
perennial temptation for politicians, who can clearly identify the votes of the 
losers to be helped but cannot expect any reward from the promise that their pain 
will be good for the living standards of future citizens overall. The history of 
industrial and trade policy formation shows that the political economy of 
productivity improvement is highly prone to such influences. 
The heyday of UK industrial policy, justified on the grounds of capital 
market failure, was in the late 1960s and 1970s, and the results were well 
described by Morris and Stout (1985, p. 873): ‘it was losers like Rolls Royce, 
British Leyland and Alfred Herbert who picked Ministers.... What was described 
as “picking winners” appeared in practice to amount to spending huge sums 
shoring up ailing companies ...’. For example, government contributions to civil 
aircraft and engine development from 1945 to 1974 totalled £1.5 billion at 1974 UK Productivity Performance 
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prices and produced receipts of £0.14 billion (Gardner, 1976). Similarly, 
Greenaway and Milner (1994) conclude that the pattern of protection in the form 
of nominal tariffs in the UK in 1979 was primarily accounted for in terms of the 
adjustment costs associated with threatened contraction of industries with high 
import penetration and intensity of use of unskilled labour. 
Recent history does not suggest that problems of government failure are only 
found in the distant past. For example, the Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI) response to recent difficulties in contracting industries, such as cars and 
coal, reflects the traditional short-termist political calculations. Similarly, the 
Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR)’s timidity in 
pursuing congestion charging on roads despite the substantial welfare gains that 
could be achieved (May, Coombe and Gilliam, 1996) and the lack of any 
obvious connection between its transport infrastructure programmes and 
investment decisions based on social rate of return criteria (Glaister, 1999) do 
not suggest that correcting market failures is uppermost in spending ministries’ 
decision-making. 
In this context, the Treasury report would have been improved by explicit 
consideration of government failure and strategies to contain it. For example, 
one type of solution to this problem may lie in reducing the discretion available 
to politicians by credible pre-commitment to rules that prevent interventions that 
inhibit creative destruction. Clearly, the international obligations of participation 
in the World Trade Organisation are helpful in this regard, and so too may be EU 
membership, especially if the rules on State Aids are tightened and the European 
Commission is more assiduous in the effective policing of them.  
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
We now return to the questions posed in the Introduction to this paper and 
summarise the answers suggested by the detailed discussion in Sections II to V. 
1. How Should Growth Accounting Comparisons of UK Productivity 
Performance Be Interpreted? 
Growth accounting distinguishes between labour productivity growth from 
capital deepening and TFP growth. It is important, however, not to see this as 
equivalent to attributing sources of growth in terms of investment and technical 
change, respectively. Thinking in terms of endogenous innovation embodied in 
new types of capital goods implies that the contribution of technological 
progress is partly reflected through capital deepening. It is particularly important 
to recognise this in the context of ICT, where over 20 per cent of UK labour 
productivity growth since 1979 has come from growth in ICT capital intensity 
(Oulton, 2001). Fiscal Studies 
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2. What Have Been the Proximate Sources of the Gap between the Productivity 
Performance of the UK and That of Its Peer Group? 
Productivity in the UK continues to lag behind that of other countries. In 1999, 
purchasing-power-parity-adjusted real GDP per hour worked was about 25 per 
cent lower than in both France and the USA. The gap in labour productivity with 
unified Germany was somewhat lower, at 11 per cent. Relative to France and 
West Germany, the differences in labour productivity levels are very similar to 
those of 1979. On this measure, UK relative economic decline has ceased but not 
been reversed. 
Analysis of the proximate determinants of relative productivity performance 
indicates a notable difference in the sources of the productivity gap: between the 
UK and the USA, innovation plays the major role; between the UK and 
European countries, broad capital, including both investment and skills, is more 
important. When explicit account is taken of stocks of R&D and skills, TFP gaps 
relative to both the USA and France have been reduced substantially since 1979. 
Together with the evidence of the impact of privatisation and continuing agency 
problems in UK firms, this suggests that the changed emphasis in supply-side 
policy away from industrial policy towards deregulation was justified but that a 
strengthening of competitive pressures in the UK economy would still be 
welcome. 
The ICT revolution plays a part in explaining the Anglo-American (though 
not the Anglo-European) productivity gap. A comparison of the estimates in 
Oliner and Sichel (2000) and Oulton (2001) indicates that the ICT capital-
deepening contributions to labour productivity growth were fairly similar 
through to the mid-1990s, but the recent US acceleration has affected relative 
capital/labour ratios. However, relative weakness in UK innovation is pervasive 
and pre-dates the ICT era. 
3. How Do Incentive Structures Impact on Growth? 
Growth economists are now much more aware of the potential impact on long-
run growth of incentive structures that affect the expected profitability of 
investment and innovation. However, the policy implications of some popular 
endogenous growth models, which appear to justify large subsidies to physical 
investment and the abandonment of competition policy, are dangerous 
oversimplifications. It is important to recognise the role of agency costs in the 
design and implementation of policy. This is because they affect the response of 
both private and public sector managers and also inform the enthusiasm of 
politicians for productivity improvement in a world of creative destruction. Both 
market failure and government failure matter for productivity performance. UK Productivity Performance 
303 
4. Is the Government’s Stance on Productivity Appropriate in the Light of Recent 
Theory and Evidence? 
The recent Treasury report on productivity (HM Treasury, 2000) embodies many 
of the recent developments in the academic growth literature. Its main themes 
stand in stark contrast to the approach of policy-makers in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Thus competition policy is given more emphasis than industrial policy, and 
government’s role is characterised as addressing a number of apparent market 
failures and establishing a framework conducive to macroeconomic stability. 
Attention is paid both to proximate determinants of productivity and to incentive 
structures. The recognition that the UK productivity gap is substantial and not 
amenable to a quick fix is realistic. Fiscal policy adjustments may have been 
marginally favourable to faster growth in the medium term. 
Nevertheless, the Treasury report also has some notable omissions. In 
particular, these relate to government rather than market failure and the role that 
incentive structures play in the public sector. There is no explicit discussion of 
the possibility that time inconsistency may justify reducing ministers’ discretion 
in microeconomic as well as macroeconomic policy. The document’s apparent 
confidence that market failures can and will be fixed by well-planned 
government intervention appears to owe more to a Bob the Builder mentality 
than to a hard-headed appraisal of the government’s record in office. 
If agency problems are significant in the private sector, they surely also 
matter in the public sector. To some extent, this has been accepted by both the 
present government and its predecessor. Privatisation and performance targets, 
including efficiency savings, have been the chief ways of addressing this issue. 
The very short discussion in the Treasury report is disappointing both in its 
brevity and in its lack of incisiveness in evaluating control and productivity 
problems in the public sector. There is, however, a separate report promised on 
these issues, and it is to be hoped that it will offer both a full evaluation of the 
present system and an analysis of possible alternatives. 
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